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1 Introduction
Religious attitudes and participation diﬀer markedly between the United
States and Europe. In the United States, more than 40% of population at-
tend church weekly and religious participation has increased steadily over the
last two hundred years. Europe is much more secular: In Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden, less than 10% of population attend church weekly, in
the United Kingdom around 15%, and in Germany 16% (Iannaccone 1998;
Bruce 1999; GESIS 2008: 19). Starting from higher levels of religiosity,
Catholic European countries like Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have ex-
perienced remarkably strong trends towards secularization; the same applies
to Orthodox Greece (Brañas-Garza 2004; Voas 2004).
Also political attitudes and public opinion towards the necessity or desir-
ability of policing religious groups tend to diﬀer significantly between Europe
and the United States (Kent 2001). In general, Europeans have a more cau-
tious attitude towards new religious groups while Americans place higher
value on religious laissez-faire. Several European governments engage in the
regulation and surveillance of sects (e.g., Scientology), and France in 2001
even adopted a law (known as Loi About-Picard) with the intention of re-
pressing and controlling cultic movements that undermine human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Such regulations are alleged by many commentators
(notably from the United States) to infringe religious and civic freedoms
(Hervieu-Léger 2004).
So far, the economic theory of religion has been divided over possible
causes of the great diﬀerences in religious participation and attitudes to-
wards sects. The dominant strand of the theory of religious markets, the
so-called supply-side theory, views the demand for religion as largely invari-
ant across time and space such that diﬀerences in religious patterns must
be attributed to diﬀerences on the supply sides of religious markets (Stark
and Bainbridge 1996; Stark and Finke 2001). Supply-side theory argues that
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religious markets in Europe are dominated by “lazy” monopoly churches
without entrepreneurial zeal while the United States hosts large numbers of
competitive sects and religious groups that vie actively for devotees. Open-
ness and competitive pressures in American religious markets serve the needs
of religious customers better and thereby generate higher participation and
consumer satisfaction than drowsy religious dinosaurs in Europe. Studies by
Iannaccone (1991), Stark and Iannaccone (1994), Stark et al. (1995), and
Iannaccone (1998) indeed corroborate a positive correlation between rates of
religious diversity and religious participation. However, Voas et al. (2002)
and Bruce (1999) dismiss these observations as mere statistical artefacts.
Moreover, supply-side theory so far has not been able to resolve a number of
intriguing puzzles in religious markets. It, for example, cannot explain why
more fervent sects do not overtake “monopoly churches” in Western Europe
where religious competition has been free for at least several decades. Fur-
thermore, supply-side theory has trouble with explaining why there are also
vast diﬀerences in religious market structures across the United States — al-
though the same openness and rights of religious freedom apply in all states.1
In addition, Bruce (1999: Chs. 3 and 4) and Chaves and Gorsky (2001) cite
numerous examples from the United States and Europe, both historical and
recent, suggesting that the supply siders’ prediction of a positive association
between pluralism and religious vitality is questionable. Finally, supply-side
theory cannot (and, to be fair, does not try to) explain why attitudes towards
the regulation of religious markets diﬀer so greatly across countries that are
equally strict in their separation of church and state like the United States
and France.2
In this paper, we propose a formal model of a sects market from which
1Also see Bruce (1999) on that point. For empirical evidence on diﬀerences in religious
participation within the United States, see adherents.com (2009).
2According to Chaves and Cann (1992) and Messner (1999), the United States, Canada,
Australia, France, the Netherlands and, surprisingly, Ireland are the Western countries
where religion is most deregulated and church-state separation is strictest.
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a possible story for these phenomena emerges. In that model, both demand
and supply are endogenous: Customers (i.e., potential members of sects)
have religious wants. Entrepreneurs in the sects market provide spiritual
services and, in return, demand compensation that depends on their personal
characteristics, which we label as “persuasiveness”.3 More persuasive leaders
are able to collect larger contributions and thus have a comparative advantage
in running a sect.4 As in many contributions to the economics of religion (for
an exception see, however, Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975), our paper focuses on
life on earth, without taking a stance on the existence of afterlife. The
potential benefits of an afterlife are taken as a given intrinsic motivation for
sect membership.
Our analysis provides a possible way of obtaining cross-country diﬀer-
ences in religious outcomes without resorting to diﬀerences in religious de-
mand or supply as such. This argument is based on a multiplicity issue:
equilibria in sects markets are generally not unique. In particular, both “sec-
ular” (European-type) equilibria — characterized by a small number of small
sects demanding large contributions of their members and an otherwise low
religious participation rate — and “sectarian” (American-type) equilibria —
where a substantial part of the population is distributed over a large number
of on average rather low-demanding sects — might emerge. The same set of
initial conditions (represented by distributions of consumer preferences and
the characteristics of the suppliers of religious services) might give rise to
diﬀerent outcomes with respect to religious participation in the population,
3Viewing religious groups as driven by monetary incentives dates at least back to Adam
Smith (1999[1776]: 376f). Empirical evidence ranges from the medieval Catholic church
(see, e.g., Ekelund et al. 1989, 2006: Ch. 5), the Protestant reformation (Ekelund et al.
2002) to U.S. “televangelist” Jim Bakker who diverted money collected from his follow-
ers to pay for private luxuries, including an air-conditioned dog-kennel. See Iannaccone
(1998), Iannaccone and Berman (2006), or Ekelund et al. (2006: Ch. 2) for surveys on
entrepreneurial models of religious groups.
4Whether the question is of a congregation belonging to a larger denomination, a
church, a sect or a cult, we refer to those groups simply as “sects”, and we use the word
in a neutral sense.
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the number of active sects in the market, the extent of their activities, and
their membership costs.
The underlying feature of sects markets which potentially results in mul-
tiple equilibria is — in our model — a complementarity between demand and
supply: when more people are willing to join a sect, less persuasive sect lead-
ers enter the market, which reduces average membership costs; and the lower
are the average membership costs in sects, the more individuals are willing
to join a sect.
A further implication of this complementarity in our model is that the
smaller is the number of sects that are active in a market equilibrium the
higher are the demands which these sects impose on their (relatively few)
members.5 That is, in more secular societies sects impose, on average, heav-
ier burdens on their small membership groups than in societies with higher
rates of religious participation. Hence, fears that sect leaders might “abu-
sively” extract significant resources from their members would then seem, on
average, more justified in a secular than in a sectarian equilibrium. Diﬀerent
religious equilibria might therefore also frame the perception of sects and, as
a consequence, policy attitudes towards them.
While essentially relying on a demand-and-supply framework, our analysis
entails some features that make it particularly relevant for discussing religious
markets even without explicit reference to doctrinal issues: the importance
attached to personal characteristics of leaders; asymmetric information upon
entrance in a group; the significance of psychic exit costs; the absence of
legal obligations for members to pay for membership services consumed; the
absence of an obligation for leaders to reveal the price they aim to charge be-
fore members enter; and the payment of membership contributions only after
5We only consider monetary contributions (tithes). Apart from asking for money, reli-
gious groups can and do require much of their members (Iannaccone 1992b, Berman 2000).
They impose significant costs in terms of sacrifice, abstinence from certain pleasures, strict
morality and even stigma upon their members and, in the extreme, may even drive them
to martyrdom.
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getting involved with the group. Due to its simplicity, our model necessarily
is incomplete. While we establish the possibility of multiple equilibria, we
touch only briefly on the issue of equilibrium selection. As in other areas of
economics that encounter multiple equilibria, equilibrium selection could be
determined by initial conditions. This would then allow one to incorporate
many of the aspects of a country’s history, demographics, politics, or eco-
nomic circumstances that we omit. For the moment we simply point to the
possibility of multiplicity rather than positing a (necessarily quite specific)
model for resolving this indeterminacy.
We should stress that we do not deny that there exist substantial dif-
ferences in religious markets between the United States and Europe, e.g.,
with respect to regulation, scrutiny of religion, or monopolization. Neither
do we reject the view that diﬀerences in religious behavior across the U.S.
might indeed be caused by diﬀerent attitudes and preferences in religious and
non-religious matters. We claim only that it is not necessary to rely on such
diﬀerences in the “fundamentals” in order to obtain a theoretical explanation
for diﬀerences in the outcomes of sects markets.6
While our paper endogenizes both supply and demand of religious activ-
ities, the theory of religious markets has so far focused mainly on the supply
side (for a thorough recent survey, see Kumar 2008). The four exceptions we
are aware of set up Hotelling-type models of religious markets: Rodero and
Brañas (2000) analyze price competition among religious suppliers, assum-
ing denominational positions in the religious spectrum as exogenously given.
In McBride (2008a,b), ex ante identical religious groups choose their posi-
tions in the religious market such as to maximize their share of adherents,
thereby establishing groups diﬀering in their religious strictness. Potential
members diﬀer in their preferences. In our framework, potential religious
entrepreneurs and potential members both are ex ante diﬀerent. Entrepre-
6In other words, the supply-sider’s tenet that “[f]aced with American-style churches,
Europeans would respond as Americans do” (Stark and Finke 2000: 237f) needs to be
qualified with the addition “provided that religious markets possess a unique equilibrium”.
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neurs diﬀer in their personal characteristics, and potential members in their
valuation of spiritual services. Information is asymmetric: members cannot
observe the type of the sect’s leader before entering, even though they have
rational expectations of the distribution of potential types. Due to asym-
metric information, sect members may end up being asked to make more
sacrifices than they would have been willing to make ex ante.7 Finally, Barro
and McCleary (2005) take the Hotelling model as their starting point for an
empirical analysis of which countries have state religions.
Any notion of sects markets is only meaningful when there is freedom to
join or to leave religious groups (and possibly, on the supply side, to establish
new groups). Countries or time periods where religious freedoms are heavily
constrained are, thus, beyond the scope of our analysis. This excludes great
parts of today’s Muslim world. Compared to Western countries, religious
diversity is typically limited and religious participation more obligatory in
Islamic countries. Moreover, it seems generally problematic to transfer the
standard theological or sociological concepts of “sects” one-by-one to Islam
(Sedgwick, 2001). Yet, as is argued, e.g., in Sedgwick (2007) or Iannaccone
and Berman (2006), the socio-economic mechanisms of religious groups gen-
erally also apply to the various denominations and (radical) sects of Islam.
Indeed, Chaves et al. (1994) demonstrate that predictions from the supply-
side theory of religion also seem to be empirically valid in case of Islam, at
least in European countries: Muslim religious activities (measured by Hajj
participation) are higher for Muslims in religiously more liberal countries
than in more regulated countries.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a stylized
model of a sects market. Section 3 analyzes equilibria in the religious econ-
7For example, it is unlikely that many of the more than 900 members who committed
suicide or were killed in Jonestown in Guyana in 1978 could have anticipated such a level
of sacrifice when they entered Jim Jones’s sect called People’s Temple. Also accusations
of sexual abuse and financial extortion suggest that the leaders’ type was not perfectly
known to members before they entered. On the positive side, sects that outsiders fear to
be abusive may turn out to be benevolent in their members’ experience.
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omy and their properties (comparative statics, existence, uniqueness, wel-
fare). Section 4 interprets our observations. Section 5 summarizes our find-
ings and concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A model of sects markets
2.1 General description
In an economy, there exist two types of agents: (potential) sect leaders
and (potential) sect members. We assume that the mass of potential members
and of potential leaders both are equal to one.
Sect leaders own sects that oﬀer spiritual services, social contacts, and
other intangible benefits exclusively8 for their customers. Sect leaders diﬀer
from one another in their leadership qualities, and sect members are distin-
guished by their willingness-to-pay for the services provided by sects. Sect
leaders are interested in expected profits, sect members search to maximize
expected lifetime utility.
A (free-entry) equilibrium in the sects market in this economy requires
three components: (i) sect foundations are consistent with profit-maximizing
behavior of potential sect leaders; (ii) a matching of potential sect mem-
bers to the active sects must be compatible with utility maximization of sect
members and profit maximization of sect leaders; and (iii) new entry into the
sect market cannot be profitable.
2.2 Potential sect leaders
In the beginning each potential sect leader decides whether to establish
a new sect, or to stay outside the market. In the latter case, he will receive
8This club-good feature of religious benefits has been stressed, e.g., by Ekelund et al.
(2006: Ch. 2).
7
a deterministic reservation profit which we normalize to zero. Establishing
a new sect comes at a fixed set-up cost d > 0, consisting of the costs of
constructing a doctrine, recruiting first disciples, and opening a church or
temple. The set-up cost is net of any psychological or spiritual satisfaction
that a sect leader might gain from establishing or taking over a sect. There
is no need, thus, to explicitly consider the religious motivations of sect lead-
ers. Sect leaders earn their revenues by charging contributions from their
members, but only at the end of the period, i.e., after having attracted the
members to their sect (see below).
Potential sect leaders diﬀer in their “persuasiveness”. We use that word
as a simple and generic term for all attributes of a sect leader that make
membership in his sect attractive and exit more costly for potential adherents:
personal charm, negotiating skills, telegenic appearance, sermonic fervor, and
convincingness.9
Persuasiveness determines how much the sect leader can request from
sect members. Unlike for other social groups, the ability of sect leaders to
charge contributions from members does not derive from a binding contract,
signed upon entrance into the sect, but from associating exit or expulsion
from the sect with certain religious or social costs (after-life punishment, loss
of the social network etc.) that sect members wish to avoid. For believers,
a threat of afterlife punishment is credible; individuals unwilling to adhere
to the sect’s rules and discipline risk the wrath of God, damnation, or other
sanctions in the afterlife.
At the time of establishing the sect and of attracting members, persua-
siveness is the leader’s private knowledge but it is non-verifiable. The persua-
siveness of potential sect leaders is distributed with continuous density f(p)
9There is a link between persuasiveness in our model and the notion of “charisma” in
the tradition of Max Weber. According to Weber (1978[1922]: 241), “charisma” refers “to
a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extra-
ordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically
exceptional powers or qualities. (. . . ) [O]n the basis of them [i.e., these qualities] the
individual concerned is treated as a ‘leader’”.
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over a closed interval [0, p]. By F (p) we denote the attending cumulative
distribution function.10
We do not presume anything about the religious qualities of sects or their
doctrines. All what matters is the persuasiveness of sect leaders, which is an
inherently personal characteristic.
2.3 Potential sect members
There is a continuum of consumers who consider joining a sect. Each
individual is assumed to enter at most one sect.11 If an individual stays
out of any sect, (s)he will receive a reservation utility, normalized to zero.
If an individual enters the sect, (s)he establishes social contacts with other
members, as well as receiving religious benefits and services. By experience,
individuals learn the persuasiveness of their sect leaders. At the end of the
membership period, sect leaders ask sect members to contribute money or
services. In each sect, all members pay the same contribution while contri-
butions diﬀer across sects.12 Sect members then choose whether to pay what
is asked or to exit the sect. When indiﬀerent, they stay.
10As argued by a referee, persuasiveness might be an ordinal variable; our analysis
and especially the algebraic operations below seem to suggest that we use it cardinally.
However, the mathematics would also work (with a bit more notational complexity) for
general functional relationships. What we essentially require is that leaving a sect with a
more persuasive leader causes higher exit costs and, thus, enables the sect leader to charge
higher contributions.
11This is in line with the empirical observation that multiple aﬃliations to religious
groups play only a subordinate role, given the often exclusive nature and clear demarcation
of most systems of belief (Haug 2001). Japan, where many people say they are both
Buddhists and Shintoists and where statistics for religious membership add up to almost
200% of the population, seems to be an exception. As explained by Stark (2004: 157) this
may be due to an understanding of “religious aﬃliation” that diﬀers from Europe and the
United States.
12The role of uncertainty and commitment costs in selecting a sect is also stressed by
Bold and Hull (1998) in a model of religious varieties. Assuming uniform contributions
within a sect does not detract from the model’s generality. At the cost of some notational
complexity, we could assume that potential sect members diﬀer in income and in the shares
of incomes they are willing to give to the sect leader of a given persuasiveness.
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We denote by h the individual’s willingness to pay for the religious benefits
and services associated with becoming a sect member and assume that h
is distributed across the population with density g(h) and support [h, h¯].
Correspondingly, denote by G(h) :=
R h
h g(ξ)dξ the cumulative distribution
function of h.
The utility u of type-h consumer if (s)he enters a sect whose leader has
persuasiveness p is given by
u(h, c) =
(
h− τ(p) if he stays in the sect and pays contributions
h− x(p) if he leaves the sect,
(1)
where τ and x denote contributions (tithes) and exit costs, respectively.
In (1) we assume that the religious gross benefits of sect membership (es-
tablishing a relationship with God, obtaining ethical guidelines, being bap-
tized etc.) are irredeemable, i.e., they would not be lost upon exit from the
sect. Religious net benefits in case of leaving the sect may diﬀer, as a persua-
sive sect leader may convince sect members of after-life punishment if they
leave (also see footnote 13 below). This also reflects the typical time pattern
of sect membership: members first receive services without paying and be-
come absorbed, and only later are they asked to pay. Therefore, our model
suggests that religious organizations may allow people to participate without
contributing until they become absorbed. What may appear as tolerating
free-riding by new members can then, eﬀectively, be a profit-maximizing in-
vestment into making them stay.
In reality, entrance choices into sects are driven not only by expectations
about the sect leader’s persuasiveness but also by past experiences, family
and ethnic backgrounds, or social environments. For sake of simplification,
we omit these issues; they do not aﬀect the core of our argument.
In (1) it is further assumed that neither contributions nor exit costs diﬀer
across individuals. The first assumption can be justified by the inability
of sects eﬀectively to diﬀerentiate the contributions they levy according to
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their members’ individual willingness to pay, which is private information.
The second assumption is made for simplicity. If the willingness to pay
for sect membership depended on an individual-specific variable and sect
leader’s persuasiveness, then sect leaders would ask for a contribution so as
to maximize expected payments from their members, taking into account
that this may lead into exit by those with the lowest willingness to pay.
We assume that exit costs x are strictly increasingly related to the per-
suasiveness level of the sect leader. For simplicity, but without any loss of
generality, we will henceforth assume that exit costs are (numerically) equal
to the persuasiveness level of the sect leaders from whose sect the members
exit: x(p) = p.
Upon entrance into a sect, the leader’s persuasiveness is still unknown
to potential sect members. Hence, all sects appear ex ante identical and
membership decisions are based on expectations about membership and exit
costs (taking into account that these are related one-to-one to persuasiveness
levels).
3 Equilibria and their properties
3.1 Equilibrium in the sects market
Knowing the preference structure of his members, a profit-maximizing
sect leader will demand contributions equal to what would be his members’
11
exit cost. That is, contributions (numerically) equal persuasiveness:13
τ(p) = x(p) = p.
As a consequence of this price setting, no sect member will ever leave a sect.
Denoting by P the expected persuasiveness level in the religious market,
consumer h expects his or her utility (1) from joining a sect to be equal to
Eu(h, p) = h− P. (2)
While each individual treats P as exogenous, it is endogenous on the level of
economy.
With a reservation utility of zero, an individual of type h will join a sect
whenever h ≥ P . If an individual of type h joins a sect, so will all individuals
of types h0 > h (at a given level of P ). Denote by bh the smallest willingness-
to-pay that leads to sect-membership. The mass of individuals who join a
sect at all is then given by 1−G(bh).
A sect leader with persuasiveness level p expects to earn profits
m · p− d. (3)
Here, m denotes the number of members per-sect.
A sect leader’s profits increase with his persuasiveness. Thus, if a sect
leader with persuasiveness p becomes active (i.e., (3) is non-negative), so will
all more persuasive leaders. In a long-run equilibrium of the sects market,
profitable entry does no longer occur. Hence, the marginal persuasiveness
13 We could easily add to the model benefits from sect membership that positively
depend on the persuasiveness of the sect leader and that would be foregone upon exit
from the sect. Denoting such benefits by b(p), individual h’s utility (1) from becoming
and staying a sect member would then be h+ b(p)− τ(p), while the decision to first join
and later leave a sect would yield h − x(p). Profit-maximizing sect leaders then would
never charge their sect members in excess of τ(p) = x(p)+ b(p) which is strictly increasing
in p and would, therefore, result in an equivalent specification of our model.
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level, denoted as bp, at which a sect leader would enter the sects market
emerges from equating (3) to zero:
bp = d
m
. (4)
The mass of sects that are active in the sects market is then given by 1−F (bp).
For potential sect members the expected costs of sect membership are
determined by the lower bound of persuasiveness in the market:
P = P (bp) := E(p|p ≥ bp) = 1
1− F (bp)
Z p
bp pf(p)dp. (5)
As sect leaders’ persuasiveness is private knowledge, sect members who
wish to enter a sect are equally distributed among all active sects. Hence,
the per-sect mass of members is given by
m =
1−G(bh)
1− F (bp) .
An equilibrium in the sects market is, thus, characterized by a pair (bh, bp)
satisfying
α(bh, bp) = P (bp)− bh = 0 (6)
β(bh, bp) = d− 1−G(bh)
1− F (bp) · bp = 0. (7)
The loci α = 0 and β = 0 can be interpreted as, respectively, the demand
and the (long-run) supply function of the sects market. Both loci describe
upward-sloped graphs in the (bh, bp)-space. To see this, first observe from (5)
that expected membership costs are higher, the higher are persuasiveness
requirements to induce sect leaders to enter into the market:
P 0(bp) = f(bp)
1− F (bp) · [P (bp)− bp] > 0.
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The positive slopes of α = 0 and β = 0 then follow from
αp(bh, bp) = P 0(bp) > 0
αh(bh, bp) = −1
βp(bh, bp) = − 1−G(bh)(1− F (bp))2 · (1− F (bp) + bpf(bp)) < 0
βh(bh, bp) = g(bh) · bp1− F (bp) > 0.
Intuitively, this makes sense: Consumers’ threshold willingness to pay for
joining a sect rises with the expected membership costs which themselves
increase in the level of persuasiveness (hence, the α-locus is upward-sloped).
On the other hand, the threshold level for sect leaders to enter into the sects
market decreases with market size (since all costs are fixed costs) which itself
is smaller the fewer customers join a sect (hence, the β-locus is also upward-
sloped).
3.2 Comparative statics
Assume that h and p are distributed such that an equilibrium (i.e., a
simultaneous solution of α = β = 0) exists. We directly obtain from (6) and
(7) that bp and bh move in identical directions as d: if set-up costs increase,
fewer sects (bp increases) go along with higher membership costs and, thus,
fewer sect members (bh increases, too). To summarize:
Proposition 1 A (small) increase in the set-up costs for sects leads to less
activities in the sects market if and only if the initial equilibrium in the sects
market exhibits Marshallian stability.
Geometrically, an increase in the costs of establishing a sect leads to fewer
activities (fewer sects and fewer sect members) if and only if the “demand
curve” (i.e., α(h, p) = 0 understood as the amount of persuasiveness p that
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would be demanded if the price were h) is flatter than the “supply curve”
(i.e., β(h, p) = 0 understood as the amount of persuasiveness p that would
be supplied if it earned a price h). While this condition generally cannot be
ensured, Marshallian stability of equilibria in the sects market is intuitively
plausible, as the adjustment process underlying this stability concept makes
clear: Suppose the sects market is out of equilibrium and, say, oﬀered posi-
tive profits to some potential sect leaders who are currently inactive (the case
of losses to marginal active sects follows mutatis mutandis). In particular,
those potential sect leaders who previously were indiﬀerent whether to enter
or not now would find it optimal to enter the market. In turn, the average
price of sect membership would decrease which would encourage more poten-
tial members to join a sect. This would attract even more entrants, and the
upward spiral in the number of sects and in sect membership would continue
until a new equilibrium is reached.
3.3 Existence and multiplicity of equilibria
So far, we have taken for granted both the existence and the uniqueness
of an equilibrium in the sects market. However, as both α = 0 and β = 0
are upward-sloped, neither non-existence nor multiplicity of equilibria can be
ruled out.
Clearly, the equilibrium configurations are determined by the primitives
of the model — which in our case are the distribution functions (including the
support) of consumer types and persuasiveness levels. Depending on their
shape, equilibria may fail to be unique or even to exist. This point can be
easily made for the case of uniform distributions. In particular, observe
Proposition 2 Suppose that the distribution of persuasiveness across sect
leaders is uniform on the interval [0, 1] and the distribution of consumer
types is uniform on [a, b], where 0 ≤ a < 1.14 Then there exists b¯ ∈ (a, 1)
14The case a ≥ 1 is uninteresting as everybody would then join a sect for sure.
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such that:
• If the maximal willingness to pay for sect membership is too low (i.e.,
if b < b¯), then no equilibrium exists in sects markets.
• If the maximal willingness to pay for sect membership is below, but not
too much so, the maximal persuasiveness level (i.e., if 1 ≥ b > b¯), then
two equilibria exist in the sects market.
• If the maximal willingness to pay for sect membership exceeds the max-
imal persuasiveness level (i.e., if b > 1), a unique equilibrium exists in
the sects market.
Figure 1 illustrates this proposition for d = 0.25 and consumer types
distributed uniformly on [0.5, b], where we chose b to take values of 0.7, 0.82,
0.9, 1, and 1.1.
Figure 1 goes here.
In Figure 1, (6) is represented by the straight line. In increasing order
of b from left to right, the convex curves show condition (7). In line with
Proposition 2, the number of equilibria develops from zero (b = 0.7) to one
(b = 0.82) to two (b = 0.9 and b = 1), back to one again (b = 1.1). The exact
equilibrium values of bh and bp are calculated in the Appendix.
The possible multiplicity of equilibria in sects markets can be explained
as follows: Before entering a sect, individuals form expectations about the
costs of sect membership. An individual will become a member of a sect if his
willingness to pay for sect services exceeds or equals expected membership
costs. These costs are, however, on average lower the larger is the number of
sects that is active in the market. Looking at the supply side of the market,
however, sects will enter the market only if they can at least recover their
costs from membership contributions. This condition is easier to be met the
larger the sect or the more persuasive the sect leader (since he can extract
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higher contributions); both eﬀects point in the direction of a small number
of active sects. As a consequence, the equilibrium configuration is not clear.
In essence, multiplicity is caused by a complementarity between demand
(represented by bh) and supply (represented by bp): the more people are will-
ing to join a sect, the lower is the minimum persuasiveness level needed to
attract them; and the lower the persuasiveness level (i.e., the cheaper sect
membership), the more individuals are willing to join a sect.
With multiple equilibria, those with higher persuasiveness thresholds
(and, thus, with fewer sects) also exhibit higher willingness-to-pay thresh-
olds (and, thus, lower religious participation). Hence, there can be
• equilibria with many sects, a high rate of sect membership in the pop-
ulation and rather low expected membership costs (as low-profile sect
leaders with low persuasiveness also enter the market); and
• equilibria with a small number of sects, a low rate of membership but
rather high expected membership costs (as only high-profile sect leaders
enter the market).
We call the former type of equilibria sectarian and the latter type secular.
In the uniform case reported in Proposition 2, multiplicity comes in the form
of one sectarian and one secular equilibrium. However, with non-uniform dis-
tributions multiplicity generally is not limited to two equilibria only; the loci
(6) and (7) may intersect many times. Using a piecewise uniform distribu-
tion for persuasiveness, we provide an example for the (up to) four-equilibria
case; adding more segments with diﬀerent densities to the distribution would
then allow us to generate as many equilibria as we wish.
3.4 Dynamic stability
The existence of several equilibria raises the issue of which equilibrium
will actually emerge. Typically (and especially in macroeconomics, where
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models with multiple equilibria abound),15 this question is approached by
a stability analysis in a dynamic framework. Following these examples, we
suggest a simple version of Marshallian dynamics for the sects market:
h˙(h, p) = s1 · (P (p)− h)) (8)
p˙(h, p) = s2 ·
µ
d− 1−G(h)
1− F (p) · p
¶
(9)
where s1, s2 > 0 denote adjustment speeds. The first equation states that
demand for sect membership will increase (i.e., h will decrease) if joining a
sect is utility-increasing (see (2)). The second equation implies that there
will be market entry of additional sect leaders (i.e., p will decrease) if the
sects market still oﬀers positive profits (see (3)). A market equilibrium (bh, bp)
clearly will be a steady-state (h˙ = p˙ = 0) of these markets dynamics. The
stability properties are summarized in
Proposition 3 A steady state of the system (8) and (9) is asymptotically
stable whenever the market equilibrium exhibits Marshallian stability.
Together with Proposition 1, this result states that every equilibrium
configuration that shows reasonable comparative static properties (in the
sense that higher costs lead to reduced religious activities) can also be reached
as the long-run outcome of a dynamic process with entry and exit of sect
leaders and sect members.
For multiple equilibria with uniform distributions, Proposition 3 yields
Corollary 4 Suppose that sect leaders’ persuasiveness and consumers’ willingness-
to-pay are uniformly distributed. If there are multiple (in this case, two) equi-
libria in the sects market, then the sectarian one is (asymptotically) stable
while the secular one is unstable.
15See, e.g., Howitt and McAfee (1988), or Graham and Temple (2006).
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We should stress that this corollary does not imply that secular equilibria
are unlikely to persist: The corollary holds only for uniform distributions;
for other distributions, situations with low religious participation can well be
stable.
3.5 “Excessive” membership fees
Finally, let us hint at an interesting feature of equilibria in the sects
market:
Proposition 5 Membership fees in some sects may exceed the maximum
willingness to pay of every sect member.
An example for this feature is provided in the proof of Proposition 2 (see
the “sectarian cases” for b < 1 there). The point is relevant for sects whose
leaders are very persuasive. Membership in such sects entirely consists of
ex post-disappointed individuals. Ex ante, however, these individuals joined
sects voluntarily, engaging in a gamble with expected positive payoﬀ.
3.6 Welfare comparison
While establishing welfare comparisons between various equilibria is, in
general, a demanding task, our model allows for a simple and clear-cut rank-
ing of equilibria in the sects market. We obtain
Proposition 6 When there are multiple equilibria, they can be ranked so
that the more active sects there are in an equilibrium, the higher are con-
sumer surplus and producer surplus, and the lower is the average price of
sect membership.
As both consumer surplus and producer surplus are larger with more
sects, so is social welfare. Our finding suggests that currently active sect
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leaders could benefit from increased competition by new entrants. As in-
creased competition by less persuasive sect leaders results in lower average
membership costs, it encourages entry by potential members staying initially
outside the market.
Furthermore, we find that entry by less eﬀective sect leaders requires an
increase in average sect size (1−F (bp))/(1−G(bh)), thus boosting the profits
of more eﬀective sect leaders. A market-creating eﬀect, i.e., the increase in
overall religious participation 1−G(bh) would then override a market-stealing
eﬀect, triggered by the increase in the number of suppliers 1− F (bp).
4 Interpretation
Our sparse model suggests possible explanations for diﬀerences in the re-
ligious participation in Europe and in the United States. While these expla-
nations are somewhat speculative and we do not claim to say a final word on
the topic, we hope that our framework provides inspiration for future studies.
4.1 Multiple equilibria
Our first contribution is to demonstrate that countries, although being
(nearly) identical with respect to their current conditions for religious de-
mand and supply can end up in diﬀerent equilibrium configurations of their
sects markets. As shown in the previous section, the same set of demand and
supply parameters may lead into secular (low level of religious activities) and
sectarian (high level) equilibria. From an interpretative view, the presence
of two equilibria with the same underlying distribution suggests that diﬀer-
ent equilibria in the sects market need not reflect fundamental diﬀerences in
populations, but may simply result from diﬀerent contingencies. The struc-
ture of the market of religions does not necessarily bear a one-to-one relation
to the distribution of religious traits, spiritual desires, or social needs in a
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population.
Cross-country diﬀerences in sects market equilibria need, thus, not be
due to diﬀerences in supply or demand conditions, diﬀerent degrees of in-
formational asymmetries, diﬀerent institutional settings, diﬀerences in the
populations’ spiritual neediness or susceptibility to religious marketing etc.;
they simply could be diﬀerent equilibrium realizations in a market game with
indeterminate outcome.
Our model does not rule out the possibility that there exist several as-
ymptotically stable equilibria in sects markets (see the example in the Ap-
pendix). In a dynamic context each of these equilibria could actually be
observable under occasional perturbations of the system. This observation
could strengthen the contingency interpretation of diﬀerences in sects mar-
ket outcomes: Even countries (say, within continental Europe or diﬀerent US
states) that started from historically similar situations with respect to reli-
gious regulations, population structures, etc. could, over time, be driven to
entirely dissimilar religious outcomes that may persist even after the initial
diﬀerences no longer are present. An analysis of the underlying historical rea-
sons for the diﬀerent equilibria is an important challenge for future research,
possibly jointly with historians.
As is the case with many models where multiple equilibria are Pareto
rankable, there is no guarantee that society does not get stuck in a dominated
equilibrium. This is, e.g., the case in Keynesian macro-models of thin markets
à la Diamond (1982) or Howitt (1985). Coordination failure (with the result
that dominated equilibria are played) is quite commonly also observed in
reality and in experiments.
Finally, recall that when fewer people join sects, higher expected mem-
bership costs are imposed on those who join. The more secular a society the
more demanding are those few sects that actually are active — and the more
easily can these sects be regarded as exploiting or abusing their members.
This observation might explain why attitudes towards sects are less lenient
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in “secular” countries than when larger fractions of the population are reli-
giously aﬃliated.
4.2 Welfare results
Proposition 6 states that sectarian equilibria generate higher welfare than
secular equilibria (which host more demanding sects). A lower average per-
suasiveness — and, thus, lower expected membership costs and a larger num-
ber of sects — are welcomed by consumers (individual and total expected
consumer surplus increase), and by sect leaders (the incumbents benefit from
increased sect sizes and the new entrants would otherwise stay out of the
market).
An important caveat with respect to our welfare results is that they refer
to ordinary sects that charge a membership fee as an ex-post compensation
for providing religious services. In an amplified manner, the same mecha-
nism can also be exploited by destructive [religious] sects and even terrorist
groups. At worst, such groups end up promoting violence against other peo-
ple or suicide of their members (think, e.g., of al-Qaida, Aum Shinri Kyo,
or the Davidian Branch). Berman (2003), Ferrero (2005), and Iannaccone
and Berman (2006) explain the emergence of radical religious militias and
Jihadists along these lines.
As outlined at the end of Section 3.5., finding oneself trapped in a highly
demanding sect might be the unwarranted consequence of a rational gam-
ble. Those not believing that people choose faith or sect aﬃliations in a
rational way may see members of such high-demanding (“abusive”) sects as
victims who ought to be protected by the state. Diﬀerent views on individual
rationality then translate into diﬀerent policy stands: a laissez-faire policy
concerning religion is more consistent with the assumption of full rational-
ity, while a more interventionist policy would draw support from imperfect
rationality.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we make several contributions to the economic theory of re-
ligion: First, we oﬀer an explanation, consistent with rational choices of sect
members and of religious entrepreneurs, for the puzzlingly large diﬀerences
in religious market outcomes and membership across the United States or
between the United States and most European countries. By showing that
sects markets may exhibit multiplicity, we complement (and partly challenge)
the so-called supply-side theory of religious markets according to which dif-
ferent patterns of religious activities in diﬀerent countries are mainly the
consequence of diﬀerent supplies in the religious market.16 The observation
that a single set of initial (demand and supply) conditions can give rise to
a multitude of equilibrium outcomes with high or low rates of religious par-
ticipation, larger or smaller sects, and higher or lower average costs of sect
membership suggests that the observed diversity in religious patterns might
just be an eventuality.
Second, we augment the theory of religious markets by considering free
entry decisions of potential sect leaders. So far, the supply side in reli-
gious market (the set of active religious entrepreneurs) has by and large been
assumed to be parametrically fixed. We view endogenizing entry into the
religious market to be crucial in understanding the religious market in coun-
tries without state-endowed monopoly churches and possibly also in countries
with such a monopoly; see Barro and McCleary (2005).
Third, we demonstrate that membership in an “abusive” and exploiting
sect need not be an irrational act. Wishing never to have entered a certain
16While Bruce (1999) uses evidence that contradicts the supply-side theory of religious
markets to dismiss the rational-choice approach to religion, our analysis suggests that
the rational-choice approach is well-suited to derive a manifold of empirically relevant
predictions, and therefore ought to be refined, rather than dismissed, as a tool for analyzing
religion.
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sect can just be the undesired consequence of an ex-ante perfectly rational
gamble.
A fourth contribution consists of welfare analysis. We establish conditions
under which an equilibrium with a larger number of sects results in higher
consumer and producer surpluses. We even find that a move to an equilibrium
with more active sects is accompanied by an increase in average sect size
and in sect profits. The market-creating eﬀects of sectarian competition
exceed the market-stealing eﬀects. However, these results only hold under
the restrictive assumptions of the model, including that religious groups do
not generate any externalities and that membership in such groups is an
individual choice.
Fifth, we tentatively relate our findings to the emergence of political at-
titudes concerning the necessity of policing sects markets. We demonstrate
that in more secular societies (say, the European ones) sects impose, on aver-
age, heavier burdens on their members than in societies with higher rates of
religious participation (say, the United States). Fears that sect leaders might
(abusively) extract significant resources and control the private lives of their
members would then appear, on average, more justified in a secular than in a
sectarian equilibrium. Diﬀerences in the perception of sects, therefore, need
not reflect diﬀerences in underlying preferences or market basics, but may
already arise from living in societies with diﬀerent equilibria.
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Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1
From (6) and (7) we derive:
dbp
dd
=
h
βp(bh, bp) + βh(bh, bp) · P 0(bp)i−1 . (10)
The sign of (10) is a priori unclear. Observe, however, that
dbp
dd
≥ 0 ⇐⇒
βp(bh, bp)
βh(bh, bp) ≤ αp(
bh, bp)
αh(bh, bp)
⇐⇒ dbp
dbh
¯¯¯¯
β=0
≥ dbp
dbh
¯¯¯¯
α=0
. (11)
This is precisely the condition for Marshallian stability (Takayama 1985:
296f). Observe that it can be written as
f(bp)g(bh)bp(P (bp)− bp) ≥ (1−G(bh))(1− F (bp) + bpf(bp)).
Both sides of this inequality are positive, but cannot generally be compared.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that the distributions of persuasiveness across sect leaders and
of consumer types are both uniform. That is, h is uniformly distributed
over an interval [a, b] ⊂ R with b > a > 0, and p is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], which is an innocuous normalization.17 The sects market is then
17If p were uniformly distributed over [γ1, γ2], define ep := (p− γ1)/(γ2 − γ1) which will
be uniform on [0, 1]. Then let h undergo the same shift; this would not aﬀect uniformity
of its distribution. Proceed as below and afterwards re-transform the variables.
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characterized by
P (bp) = 1 + bp
2
, and m =
b− 1+bp
2
b− a .
Hence (6) reads as bp = 2bh− 1 =: p1(bh)
while (7) is given by b−bhb−a · bp1−bp = d or
bp = d(b− a)
d(b− a) + b− bh =: p2(bh).
While p1 establishes a positively linear relationship between bp and bh, p2
is an increasing and strictly convex function of bh. Hence, there can at most
be two points of intersection of p1 and p2.
Observe that ∂p2(bh)/∂b ≥ 0 if and only if bh ≥ a — which always holds.
Hence, in the relevant range, an increase of b shifts p2(bh) rightwards.
Now suppose b = 1. We then have two equilibria: a corner equilibrium
(bh, bp) = (1, 1) and an interior equilibrium at (bh, bp) = (0.5+(1−a)d, 2(1−a)d).
Increasing b above 1 makes the corner equilibrium disappear (recall that
p2 will shift to the right such that the new intersection with p1 would requirebp > 1 — which is infeasible). The interior equilibrium will remain as the
unique equilibrium.
Decreasing b below 1 will keep the two equilibria, which will move together
the further we lower b. Consider
b¯ :=
1
2(1 + d)2
·
h
1 + (3 + 2a)d+ 2ad2 + 2
p
d(1 + 2d− 2a(1 + d))
i
.
At b¯ we get that at equilibrium (i.e., when p1(bh) = p2(bh)), function p2 is
tangent to p1, i.e., p02(bh) = 2 = p01(bh). Hence, we get a unique equilibrium,
and lowering b below b¯ makes equilibria disappear entirely. Below we list
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equilibrium configurations for d = 0.25 and a = 0.5 (from which b¯ = 0.82):
b Equilibria (bh, bp)
1.1 (0.619, 0.237)
1.0 (0.625, 0.25), (1, 1)
0.9 (0.638, 0.276), (0.862, 0.723)
b¯ = 0.82 (0.7, 0.4)
< 0.82 none.
A graphical illustration is provided in Figure 1 (main body of the text).
Suppose, e.g., that b = 0.9. Then, the second equilibrium is of the secu-
lar type: only a small fraction of the population (4%) is member of a sect,
paying a high price (and active sect leaders’ persuasiveness levels are high).
The first equilibrium is sectarian with a large number of sects of rather low
average persuasiveness; a large share (more than 70%) of the population is
enrolled in sects, at relatively low average costs. QED
Examples with more than two equilibria
We now show that the number of equilibria in the sects market can exceed
two. As in the proof of Proposition 2, assume that persuasiveness p is uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1]. As a consequence, (6) again reads as bh = (1+bp)/2
or bp = 2bh− 1 =: p1(bh).
By variation, assume that h is piecewise uniformly distributed on a positive
interval [a, b] in the following way (a ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ b with at least one strict
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inequality, and γ > 0 suitably18 chosen):
g(h) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ a ≤ h < a1
1−γ(b−a2+a1−a)
a2−a1 a1 ≤ h ≤ a2
γ a2 < h ≤ b
and g(h) = 0 for h /∈ [a, b]. (For a = a1 and b = a2, this boils down to the
scenario in the proof of Proposition 2, independently of γ.) The distribution
function G(h) =
R h
a g(ξ)dξ is, thus, piecewise linear on [a, b], with kinks at
a1 and a2. Then (7) is given by
bp = d
d+ 1−G(bh) =: p2(bh)
and an equilibrium is given through a value bh such that p1(bh) = p2(bh).
Set d = 0.25, a = 0.5 (as in the proof of Proposition 2) and b = 1.
Independently of a1, a2 and γ, there will always be an (unstable) fully secular
equilibrium without any sect activities: bh = bp = 1.19 Now fix a1 = 0.55 and
a2 = 0.75 and let γ vary.20
Figure 2 goes here.
Figure 2 depicts p1(bh) (the straight line) and p2(bh) for γ = 0.25, 0.75, 1,
and 2 (in descending order of the kinked curves). The number of equilibria
varies from 1 to 4 to 3 to 2. Labelling, in the four-equilibria case (γ = 0.75),
the two equilibria with high participation rates “sectarian” and the other
two “secular”, we observe that one sectarian and one secular equilibrium are
stable, while the other two equilibria are not.
Now set b = 1.2 (all other parameters unchanged). Then the fully secular
equilibrium disappears, and all equilibria are interior. Figure 3 depicts p1(bh)
18“Suitably” means that g(h) ≥ 0 for a1 ≤ h ≤ a2. This condition will always be
satisfied in the numerical examples.
19As G(1) = 1, we get that p2(1) = 1. Moreover, p1(1) = 1. Hence, an equilibrium.
20Mathematica files for the calculations and graphs are available on request.
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(the straight line) and p2(bh) for γ-values of 1, 0.6, and 0.2 (in descending
order of the kinked curves), all exhibiting diﬀerent stability patterns: For
γ = 1, there is a unique stable secular equilibrium, while for γ = 0.2, there
is a unique sectarian equilibrium. For γ = 0.6, there are one stable sectarian
equilibrium, one stable secular equilibrium, and an unstable intermediate
one.
Figure 3 goes here.
By adding more kinks to the distribution of h, we can generate scenarios
with an arbitrary number of equilibria in the sects market. Moreover, also
stability patterns may vary considerably. As our examples illustrate, both
high- and low-participation equilibria can be stable also in the case of mul-
tiple equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3
A steady state (bh, bp) of the first-order system of diﬀerential equations (8)
and (9) is asymptotically stable if each eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of
the system is negative or has negative real part. It is unstable, if at least one
eigenvalue is positive or has positive real part. The Jacobian of (8) and (9)
is
M =
Ã
αh(bh, bp) αp(bh, bp)
βh(bh, bp) βp(bh, bp)
!
where the entries are given in Section 3.1. Its eigenvalues are
e1,2 =
T
2
±
r
−D + T
2
4
(12)
where T and D are the trace and the determinant of M . Observe that
T = αh + βp < 0. Hence, D > 0 is suﬃcient and necessary for (bh, bp) to
be asymptotically stable: If D > T 2/4 > 0, then the root in (12) will be
imaginary but the real part of the eigenvalues will be negative. If 0 < D ≤
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T 2/4, the root in (12) will be real, but in absolute value smaller than |T/2|;
hence both eigenvalues are negative. If D < 0, the root in (12) will be real,
but in absolute value larger than |T/2|; hence one positive and one negative
eigenvalue emerge.
Finally, note that D = αh(bh, bp) · βp(bh, bp) − αp(bh, bp) · βh(bh, bp) > 0 is the
condition for Marshallian stability, known already from the proof of Propo-
sition 1. QED
Proof of Corollary 1
Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that a steady state (geometrically)
emerges in the intersection of a strictly convex and increasing function (p2,
representing β) with a linear function (p1, representing α). With multiplicity,
the slope of p2 in steady states with smaller [higher] participation rates must
be smaller [larger] than that of p1. However, p02 = −βh/βp and p01 = −αh/αp
such that p02 < [>]p01 is tantamount to D > [<]0. Now apply Proposition 3.21
QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider two alternative equilibria, called ϕ1 and ϕ2, such that the num-
ber of sects is larger in ϕ2: bp1 > bp2. From (5), the expected membership cost
is decreasing in the number of active sect leaders: P (bp2) < P (bp1). Thus, in-
dividuals who are sect members in ϕ1 can receive services by sects at a lower
price in ϕ2. These individuals will therefore be sect members in ϕ2, too, and
will enjoy a higher consumer surplus then. Moreover, overall participation
will be higher in ϕ2 than in ϕ1: bh2 < bh1. The additional sect members re-
ceive non-negative expected surplus in ϕ2, compared to zero in ϕ1. Hence,
consumer surplus is higher in ϕ2 than in ϕ1.
21The claim can also be verified algebraically. For uniform distributions, it turns out
that in a steady state with p-value bp, D = (1 − 2b − bp(2 − bp))/(2(b − a)(1 − bp)2) which
is positive when the numerator is. Plugging in the values for bp and investigating the sign
leads to the desired results.
30
When bp decreases, equality in (7) can only be maintained if average sect
size (1− F (bp))/(1−G(bh)) increases. Producer surplus of those sects active
in ϕ1 is then larger in ϕ2, as they receive the same contribution per member
from a larger group of members. Additional sects in ϕ2 only enter if they
earn non-negative profits, implying that producer surplus in ϕ2 is larger than
in ϕ1. QED
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Figure 1: Equilibria with uniform distributions 
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Figure 2: Multiple equilibria with piecewise uniform distributions (b=1) 
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Figure 3: Multiple equilibria with piecewise uniform distributions (b=1.2) 
 
 
